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Binance USDT-M L1 (same venue for signal/quote/fill proxy). Fill proxy = bid touched by next-bar mid. No queue, no adverse selection -> a ceiling. Taker fee 1.0 bps/side; maker 0. Kill bar: maker net > +1 bps/trade at h=36.

BTC (2024-01-01..2024-03-30)

signalhnfill ratemid bpstaker bpsmaker bpsmaker t
qimb12166350%+3.60+1.58-6.34-3.84
qimb36166150%+5.90+3.87-3.67-1.12
mpdev_bps12143050%+1.90-0.14-8.80-3.98
mpdev_bps36143050%+3.24+1.21-7.97-2.12

ETH (2024-01-01..2024-03-30)

signalhnfill ratemid bpstaker bpsmaker bpsmaker t
qimb12164050%+3.65+1.61-7.66-4.12
qimb36163650%+3.09+1.05-7.19-2.07
mpdev_bps12148250%+2.24+0.19-8.32-3.63
mpdev_bps36147850%+1.57-0.48-8.97-2.33

Verdict: REJECT

  • The maker leg is negative despite being an optimistic ceiling (~ -4 to -9 bps/trade, t -1 to -4): a passive bid fills 50% of the time, and precisely when it fills the mid has ticked down — classic adverse selection. For these momentum-style signals, passivity destroys the edge; aggression is better. No maker path is justified by this.
  • The taker leg is small-positive on this 3-month window (+1 to +4 bps) for qimb — this contradicts the full-history REJECT (crypto_l1_edge_test.md) and is most likely regime/sample noise, not a reason to act. The maker conclusion does not depend on it.
  • Result: REJECT — fast microstructure signals are not rescued by maker entry; only paid L2/queue data could test a smarter passive policy (join/queue/peg), and even then adverse selection caps it.